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The paper reflects comments and suggestions by Gustavo Canonero,  Mathias Dewatripont  and
Jacques Morisset on an earlier version.I. Introduction
A few years ago, many  western companies  were eager to consider  investment  in Eastern Europe
and more recently  in South Asia where ongoing  reforms, large domestic  markets and cheap but qualified
labor are transforming  the region in a potentially  fierce competitor on the market for foreign direct
investment  (FDI). While large commitments  by foreign investors  to these parts of the world reflect this
growing interest, actual  disbursements  have  been much  more modest. Why is that? Because  investors  are
concerned  with the government's  long term commitment  to change. The Washington  Post, for instance,
recently  quoted  an international  investment  expert saying  that in Russia the main concern is to know who
will be in power in a couple of years.'
The credibility of policy announcements  is important  for foreign investors  because once a firm
has built a plant in a foreign country, the returns that the firm earns from the sunk investment  can be
affected by subsequent changes in government policy.  For example, suppose that tariff reform is a
crucial component  of the profitability  of a project in a developing  country.  If the investor  believes  that
the reform program will not proceed as announced,  then the investment  may not take place. Thus, the
risk of policy change may be a deterrent  to foreign investors.
To reduce  the investors'  concern, governments  can try to send clear signals to demonstrate  their
commitment  to change. This paper examines  how countries  can do this through fiscal instruments. 2 The
analysis  focuses on the design of trade reforms as a signalling  device to foreign investors. For many
governments  wishing  to change  their  policy environment,  an increase  in the quantity  of foreign  investment
may be an important  component  of the success of the program.  This is why so often FDI regulation
I  Sitov,  A. (199),  "Why  investors  aren't  rushing  to  Russia",  The Washington
Post, October 29, p. Cl and C2.
2 See Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland (1992a  and 1992b), on
more  detailed  discussion  of  the  importance  of  sequencing  and  political
constraints for the design of reform packages. See also the various papers by
Rodrik on the design of trade reform.reform begins early on in the overall reform process as in India or for instance. However, foreign
investors  tend to wait for effective  indicators  of a government's  commitment  to change  before  disbursing.
Trade reform is probably  as good an indicator  as any for FDI and Katseli  for instance shows that trade
tends to "Granger-causes"  FDI and explains  it by the export  orientation  of foreign  operated  firms in many
developing  countries. 3 Therefore, it will be important  for the government  to design a trade reform that
will make the FDI reform more credible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the two basic types of
environment  in which government  promises may lack credibility. The first is when the government  may
not be able to commit  to some actions  which will be undertaken  after the economic  agent has made an
irreversible  decision. Its implications  for the optimal design of trade policy is discussed  in Section III.
The second source of credibility  problem for the government  relates to the uncertainty  of the investors
about  the long term policy  preferences  of the government.  This is being  addressed in Section  IV. Section
V summarizes  the policy conclusions.
II. Sources  of Lack of Government  Credibility
There are two main reasons why a government  may lack credibility. The first is that it cannot
commit  to its policy actions  because  these will take place after the private agents  have locked  themselves
into  some decision.  Consider  a government's  commitment  to a foreign  investor  regarding  the tax rate that
it will charge.  The government and the firm may negotiate  a tax rate prior to the entry of the firm.
However, once the firm has built its plant, the country could renege  on its promises without  driving the
firm out of the country  because  the firm's investment  is sunk.  The belief that a promised  tax rate may
3  Katseli,  L.  (1992),  FDI  and  trade  interlinkages  in  the  1980s:  experience
and prospects of developing countries, CEPR working paper #687, July
2be reneged on once the firm enters the country could deter the firm from entering the country, even
though the investment  would be beneficial  to the country. The government  ends up worse off because
of its inability  to commit  when agents are forward-looking. Since its future actions are anticipated  by
agents, they will take actions which are socially  inefficient  to protect themselves  against the anticipated
future choices of the government. Therefore, there will be efficiency  gains available  to the government
if it can commit  itself to its future policies.
The second case in which the design of policies may affect the credibility  of government  policy
announcements  occurs when the firm is uncertain about the preferences of the government, i.e. is the
government  free trade oriented  or is it fundamentally  protectionist  but acting in the short run as free trade
oriented  to achieve  specific  objectives. In this case the government  more favorable  to the foreign  investor
may attempt  to signal  its type  through the design  or speed of implementation  of its policies. For example,
Bond and Samuelson  (1986) argue that a tax holiday may be used as a signal by a country that will be
a profitable location for the investor.  This reduced tax is a worthwhile  inducement in a profitable
country, where the firm will remain and pay taxes in the future. The tax holiday will be too costly for
an unprofitable  country,  however, because  the firm will not stay around and pay taxes in the future once
it discovers  that the business  environment  is not favorable.
Similarly, Rodrik (1989) argues that countries  that are committed  to trade liberalization  may in
fact liberalize  more rapidly than is optimal in order to separate themselves  from countries  that are not
committed  to reform. In his scenario,  a country announces  that it will liberalize  trade in order to obtain
a loan. The  government  that is committed  to maximizing  national  income  will  continue  with liberalization
in the second  period because  it is the optimal policy. A government  that wants to use tariff revenue to
achieve  an income  redistribution  target will allow  liberalization  only in the first period in order to get the
loan, since the liberalization  makes it more  difficult  for the government  to achieve  its redistributive  goal.
In the second period, the government  will renege on its promise.  By raising the speed of first period
3liberalization  beyond  the optimal  rate, the national-income  maximizing  government  can make it too costly
for the redistributive  government  to mimic  its policy, and thus convince  the investors  that it will continue
with the liberalization  policy.  Section  IV considers the case in which the credibility  problem of tariff
reform is associated with uncertainty about whether the government is a free trade or protectionist
government.
III. Tariff Reform and Time Consistency
To analyze  the issue of time consistency  of a tariff reform with foreign investment,  we consider
a two period, two sector model with sector-specific  capital.  We begin by specifying  the production
model, and then derive the optimal  policy  for the host country  when it can commit  to its tariff rates prior
to the time at which initial foreign investment  decisions  are made.  We then illustrate how welfare is
affected  if the host country is unable to commit  to its tariff rate.
A. The Production  Model
In this section  we introduce  the production  model, and derive  the effects  of a tariff on the income
of factor owners and the level of foreign investment. Consider a one period two sector model with
sector-specific  capital. Sector  M produces  import-competing  goods  using sector  specific  capital (KM)  and
labor (LM),  and sector X produces the exportable  good using sector-specific  capital (K,  and labor (Lx).
Labor is mobile between sectors, so that labor market equilibrium  requires that LX + LM  =  If where L
is the fixed endowment  of labor. There is a fixed endowment  of capital in sector M, I,  which is owned
by host country residents.  Capital in  sector X is specific to  sector X,  but is potentially mobile
internationally.  The endowment  of domestically  owned  capital is denoted,  IX, and the quantity  of foreign
investment  is Z.  The use of the sector-specific  capital model to deal with foreign investment  captures
4the notion  that foreign investment  takes place because  of sector-specific  knowledge,  such as technology
and managerial  expertise, that can be applied  to production  processes in foreign countries. 4
We assume that the host country is too  small to  affect world prices which a  reasonable
assumptions  for most reforming  countries  in Eastern Europe for instance. We also normalize  by setting
the world price of each good equal to unity.  The domestic price of the importable  will then be p =
(1+r),  where r  is the ad valorem tariff.  The effects of a tariff in the one period model where the
quantity of foreign investment  is fixed at Z are well known.
In a one period model, treating the quantity of foreign investment  as given, an increase in the
tariff increases  the wage but by an amount  less than the percentage  increase in the tariff.  The impact  of
the tariff on the real return to labor will thus depend  on the share of the importable  in the consumption
bundle  of labor. The increase  in the wage results in a fall in the return to capital in sector X.  In sector
M, the real return to capital (rM/p)  rises as a result of the tariff because the real cost of labor (w/p) is
reduced by the tariff.  The fact that an increase in the tariff reduces  the return to foreign capital  creates
the possibility  that the host government  might use tariffs to extract rents from foreign investors. The
effects of an increase in foreign investment  on factor returns can also be seen in the labor market
equilibrium. An increase in Z raises the productivity  of labor in the exportables  sector. This results in
an increase in the wage rate, and a decline  in the returns to specific capital in both sectors.
Since the emphasis here is on the time consistency  problem and how it is affected by the
irreversibility  of foreign investment  decisions,  we will use a two period model to examine  the foreign
investment  decision.  This allows  us to examine  the location  decision  of foreign  investors  and endogenizes
the level of foreign investment.
4  This  approach  is  consistent  with the observation  that direct  foreign
investment is much more common in sectors characterized by the importance of
technology,  product  differentiation,  and  other  forms  of  sector-specific  knowledge
on the part of firm owners.
5The host country endowments  of factors, (1, KX,  KM)  are assumed  to be the same in each time
period. 5 In each period, the revenue function,  R (KM,  KX  + Z, p) gives the maximum  income attainable
at given factor endowments  and domestic  prices.  Under the assumption  of constant  returns to scale in
production and competition  in factor and output markets, R will be concave in the factor supplies and
convex in the price  of the importable.  In addition,  Rp =  YM  is the output of the importable and Rz =
rx the marginal  product of capital in sector X.
At the beginning  of period 0, foreign investors  choose 4,  the quantity  of capital to locate in the
host country. Foreign investment  undertaken in period 0 is assumed  to be irreversible,  which implies
Zo <  Z,.  The home (source) country return on capital in period i is denoted r'.  The host country is
assumed to be small in both goods and capital markets, so that home country return to  capital is
unaffected  by host country policies.  Letting 6 be the investor's discount on period 1 returns, foreign
investors will invest up until the point at which the return to capital is located in each country is
equalized. This condition  is
Vo - rxO(pO,Zo)  +  6rx 1(p1,Zj) =  ro +  br;.  (1)
Note that rxi in (1) is the investor's expected  future return, which will be determined  by the investor's
expectations  regarding Pi and Zl.  We will assume that investor's expectations  are rational. In period
1, the investor  will choose to locate additional  capital in the host country if rxl(p,,Zo)  >  r;.  If rx,(ZO)
< 4, no investment  will take place in the period 1.  This yields the condition  for the return on foreign
investment  to be
rxl(p,,Zl) ￿  r;,  (2)
5 We simplify by abstracting from investment in  other factors and treating
their supplies as fixed, in order to concentrate on the location decision for
foreign investment.  The model can  easily be extended to the case in  which there
is accumulation of sector-specific factors.
6with strict equality  holding if Z 1 >  4
The response  of foreign investment  to a change in the tariff can be determined  using (1) - (2).
There are two cases to consider: is the irreversibility  of investment  constraint binding  or is it not?
If the irreversibility  constraint  is binding (4  = Z,), then the impact  of tariffs is determined  by
total differentiation  of (1) with Z0 = Z 1 to be
az0 Rzp  8z  O =  _  <0  Z  0  for=  Z,  (3a)
0ar  Ro +6R1  t  R2 +8R1~ 8X  zz 6zz  z°z  ozlz
When  the irreversibility  constraint is binding, an increase in the period 1 tariff drives down the return
to capital in period 1 (rx 1 < r;).  This discourages  investment  in period  0, because  foreign investors  take
into account that the future tariff will reduce the return on capital. 6
If the irreversibility constraint is not binding, then 4  <  Z, and (1) and (2) can be solved to
yield:
=Z  =_ Rp  ;  "Zt  =0  t = 0,1; s W=t,  and  Zo < Z,  (3b)
a-rt  R tz  a  s
Increases in the tariff rates discourage investment  in the period in which they are imposed.  Note
however, that there is no impact  of the period 1 tariff on period 0 investment  in this case.  This is due
to the fact that when  period 1 investment  takes place, the period 1 return is r; from (2) regardless  of the
6  The  competitive  profit  condition  for  sector  X  requires  that  w and  rx  be
such that
CX  (w,r)  =  1  (i),
where cx  is the unit cost function.  When the irreversibility constraint is not
binding, rx =  r* regardless of the level of the tariff and the wage  rate is
unaffected by the tariff.
When  the irreversibility  discussion  is  binding, a  tariff in  period 0  causes
a decline in the amount of capital in both periods.  In period  1, the labor
demand schedule in sector M is unaffected but the labor demand schedule for X
will shift down.  Therefore, the period 1 wage will fall and rx,  will rise as a
result of the tariff.  Since rx,  rises, (4a)  indicates that rxo  must fall and the
wage rate in period 0 must rise.
7level of the period 1 tariff.
B. Domestic  Expenditure  and National  Welfare
Domestic  demand is derived from maximization  of the intertemporal  utility function
W - U(Dox,DoM)  +  fU(Dlx,DlM),  (4)
where Dii is consumption  of good j  in period i.  If we assume that domestic residents have access to
international  capital markets, with 6 denoting  the market  discount  factor on future income, the period I
(present  value)  domestic  prices of the exportable  and importable  will be 6 and 6(1  +  T)  respectively. The
preferences  of consumers  can then be characterized  by the expenditure  function  E((1  + rO),5,8(1  + rT),W).
The expenditure  function  is concave  in prices and non-decreasing  in utility. Differentiation  with respect
to the prices of the importables  yields the compensated  import demand functions,  aE/8p, =  EM;  =
Dm,((l  + rO),6,6(l  + r1),W)  for i  =  0,1.  The budget constraint of  the host country requires that
expenditure  at domestic  prices equal the value of production  and tariff revenue, less payments  to foreign
capital owners.
E((1  + rO),5,6(1  + r,),W)  =  R°(ZO,rO)  +  rO(DMO((1  + rO),6,6(1  + Tl),W)-YMOO((l  + re), Z0)) -rxo((1  + r 0),
ZO)  ZO +  6[R1(Z1,r1)  +  r,(DMl((l+rO),6,6(l+Tl),W)-YM,O((l+rl,  ZO))  - rX 1((1+r  , ZOZ,]  (5)
The relationship  between tariff rates, foreign investment, and host country welfare can be
established  using (5).  Totally differentiating  (5) yields
EdW  + YEpdSt  =  ttZE  a  -rxt-Z  at  . -
t-0  t-o  a)  (3p 
+ S  6DMt-YMt  ( AP  - - ) ZtP  )+T))  t
8where  s = 0,1 and s  *t,  and the superscripts  on the revenue functions  denote the time periods.  Since
capital markets  are assumed  to be competitive, the local rental on capital in period t, rx,t  will equal the
marginal  product of capital  at domestic  prices in period  t, R.. This yields ar/ap =  Rzp  and ar/aZ = Rzz.
Similarly, Ep =  DM  and Rp = Y implies 8DM/ap  =  Epp,  aD/aW  =  Epw,  aY/lp  =  Rp. and  aY/OZ  =  Rpz.
Substituting  these results yields
dW=c  {- [ZtRzt,+rtR  t  I dZt-  [at  (ZtR;z-Tt  (E  -Rpp)  ) -t56-Ep ] d-t  (6)
where  a  n  [Ew-iEpiw-8?2Epzw] 1 >O
We first discuss the effect of r and Z on welfare, treating the level of foreign investment  as
exogenously  determined. The first term in brackets is the effect of an increase in the quantity  of foreign
investment  on welfare in period t.  An inflow of capital lowers the return to foreign investors (ar/aK =
Rzz <  0) and causes a decline in the production  of the import-competing  good (OXM/aZ =  Rpz  <  0).
The former  effect results in an improvement  in the terms on capital  purchased  from foreigners. The latter
effect will result in an increase in welfare when r  >  0, because  an increase in the capital inflow shifts
resources  toward the exportable  sector. The second term in brackets  is the effect of the tariff on welfare.
Since an increase in the tariff reduces the return to foreign capital (arx/ap = Rpz <  0), the tariff has a
favorable effect of  redistributing income from foreign capital owners to  domestic factor owners.
However,  an increase  in the tariff has the effect of reducing  the volume  of imports  (a(DM-YM)/ap  = Epp  -
Rp  <  0), which reduces  welfare when the r > 0 because  the quantity of imports  is below the socially
optimal  level.
9The overall effect of a tariff includes  both its direct effect, which is captured  by the second term
in (6), and the indirect  effect resulting  from its impact  on the quantity of foreign investment.  Note that
the direct effect of the tariff includes  the terms of trade effect on capital, which  provides an incentive  for
the government  to impose  a tariff to drive down the payment  to foreign capital. However, (6) indicates
that the tariff will also drive out foreign  capital, which  has a negative  effect on host country  welfare. We
first examine  this question  in the case in which the host country  can commit  itself to a period 1 tariff rate
prior to the entry of investors in period  0.
C. Optimal Policy with Host Country Commitment  to Tariff Rates
If the host country  can commit  to the tariff it will charge in period 2, then the tariffs are chosen
to at time 0 to maximize  host country  welfare. The necessary  conditions  for a maximization  of domestic
welfare are obtained by setting awraj  =  0 in (6), making use of aZ7/aTj  from (4).  This yields the
following  result:
Proposition 1:  For a host country  that can commit  to its tariffs, the optimal  policy is free trade (ro =
-r1  =  0)-
To verify this result, note that at ;r  = 0 in (6) the trade volume effects of the tariff are zero.  The only
effect of the tariff in period i results from its impact on the return to foreign capitalists  (ZjRhzdri),  and
the resulting  effect of the tariff on the volume  of foreign investment  (-4ZtRzz). However, it can be seen
from (4) that these two effects  will exactly  cancel  out.  This result holds for both the case in which there
is positive  investment  in period 1 and the case where rxi <  r;.  Therefore, awMaT  =  0  at To=  T 1 =  0.
10The optimality of free trade results from the small country assumption. Since the country is
unable to affect its terms of trade in either goods or capital, the world prices represent the social cost of
the traded goods and factor services. Efficiency  dictates  that these  prices be used in resource  allocation.
In particular, note that there is no incentive for the country to use the period 1 tariff to
redistribute  income from foreign investors to domestic residents in the case where the irreversibility
constraint is binding. This is due to the fact that if the country uses a tariff to drive down the period 1
return, investors will invest  less capital in period 0.  Period 0 investment  falls until the point where rxo
has risen sufficiently  to restore equality in (1).?
D.  Optimal Host Country Policy  Without Commitment
We now consider  the case where the government  cannot commit  to its future tariff rate.  This
means  that whatever announcement  the government  makes  at time 0 concerning  the tariff rate, foreign
investors believe that government  will set ;l to maximize welfare at that time.  The question is then
whether  a government  that has announced  a free trade policy at time 0 will have an incentive  to carry out
the policy at time 1.
At time  1, the government chooses its policy to maximize U'(DMl,Dxl).  It is possible to define
an expenditure  function  El(r1,U') corresponding  to the period 1 utility  function  Ul. The budget  constraint
7  A slight  modification  is needed  in this  result  for the  case  where  the
country cannot borrow on international capital markets. If there is investment
in  period 1 under free trade, then free trade continues to  be the optimal  policy
when the firm  cannot borrow on international  capital  markets.  If there  would not
be any investment in period 1 under free trade, then it can be shown that the
optimal policy is a tariff at time 0.  In this case the government uses  its
tariff policy to borrow from the firm: it forces down the return of the at time
0, which  results  in a higher  return to the foreign  investors at  time  1 to
maintain the investment condition (1).  This intertemporal reallocation of the
returns  from the  investment is  equivalent  to a  loan from  the  firm  to  the
government.  Note that this is  not an efficient  form of loan,  because it  distorts
the trade pattern.
11in period 1 requires  that expenditure  be no larger than period 1 net income  less debt repayment  on period
O loans.
E1(r1,U 1)  =  R(Z1,rl)  +  r;(DMl-YMl)  - rx 1Zj -B/6  (7)
Totally differentiating  (7) yields
dU'=al{  [ZlR nlRlK]  dZl-  [ZlRp4-  (s1  (Epl -Rp) ] d'l},  (8)
where  al  = ETJ-rlEpu>O
Note that this welfare decomposition  is similar to that obtained for the two period problem (6).
The optimal  policy for the host country is obtained by choosing the value of T 1 at which (8) is
equal to 0, where aZ1Ia8T is given by (4).  Substitution  of (5) into (7) yields the following  result:
Proposition  2:  If the host government  cannot commit  to a period 1 tariff, the optimal  policy will be
(a) a tariff if the irreversibility  condition  binds
(b) free trade if investment  is taking place in period 1.
To establish  (a), note that when  rxi ￿  r;, aZl/8r 1 = 0.  The optimal  tariff will then be the value at which
the second term in (8) is equal to zero.  At T  =  0, we then have aUl/ar&  =  -U,Z,R4 > 0.  Since the
quantity of foreign investment  is fixed, the host country can extract surplus from foreign investors by
imposing a tariff.  The tariff results in an income redistribution  from foreign investors to domestic
residents. The optimal  tariff trades off the gain in income  due to the income redistribution  against the
loss in welfare  from the trade distortion. If investment  is taking place in the second  period, then RZlabr 1
<  0 from (Sb). In this case the tariff discourages  foreign investors, and the optimal  policy  is free trade.
12Thus, free trade will be a credible policy in this case if Z,  >  4  at T 1 =  0.  If the revenue
functions  in each period are the same and the rental available in the rest of the world were the same in
each period (r, = r4), then we would obtain  4  = Z, at free trade and free trade would  not be a credible
policy.  However, if  the host country were experiencing growth in  endowments that raised the
productivity  of foreign investment  over time, we would  expect  Z,  > 4 and free trade would  be credible.
The possibility that free trade is not a credible  policy arises because of the temptation  for the
government  to use its policy to extract rents from fixed foreign investment. Free trade will be credible
in situations  where changes  in the tariff will result in a loss in foreign  investment  to the host country, thus
eliminating  the incentive  to alter the tariff. 8
IV.  Credibility  with Uncertainty  about Government  Type
In the case of time consistency,  the foreign investor is assumed  to know the preferences  of the
government. Therefore, the investor  knows the government's optimal  tariff choice in the second time
period, which we denote  T  ,.  In this section we examine the credibility  problem that arises when the
investor  is not certain about  the type of government  that it is facing.
For example,  suppose  that there are two types of government. One type is a government  whose
objective is to maximize national income, as developed in the previous section.  We assume that the
8 This result is similar to  that obtained in the literature  on the taxation
and expropriation of foreign investment.  Worrall and Thomas (1989)  show that an
incentive compatible scheme can be designed  in which the presence of future
investment  by  the  firm  prevents  the  government  from  expropriating.  An
inefficiency arises because for some parameter values the firm will underinvest
in early periods to deter the country from expropriating.  The investment level
is  set  to  make  the  country  indifferent  between  the  current  returns  of
expropriating the  entire capital stock the future tax  payments that will be  made
if the firm is allowed to continue production.  A lower current investment level
reduces the incentive to expropriate.
13conditions  are met under which a national income maximizing  government  would find free trade to be
the time consistent  policy, so we will refer to this as the free trade government. Its optimal  policy is T  7
r  0.  We denote its welfare function
W  (Tro,Tl)  =  W'(To,'r,,ZO(TO,T,),Zl(Tro,rl)).
The other type of government  is the protectionist  government. The protectionist  government  is
assumed to be overly influenced  by the interest of factor owners in the import-competing  sector.  The
objective  function  for the protectionist  government  can be expressed  as
WP(rO,Tr)  = WF(rO,ri)  +  'Yf(1TO,T 1 ),  (9)
where II(ro,r 1)  =  rMo(rO,Zo(rO,TI))  +  6rMl(-r,ZI(TO,TI))
is the present value of the return to  the specific factor owner  and -y >  0.  We have  armlar  >  0  and
arM/aZ < 0.  Since aZIa8-  <  0, a tariff has two favorable  effects on the return to specific factors in the
import-competing  sector.  The direct effect results from the increase in the price of output, while the
indirect effect is due to the decline in the wage rate resulting from the outflow of foreign investment.
Therefore, aW'(O,O)/ari  >  0 and the optimal  tariffs for the protectionist  government  will be positive.
We denote these tariffs  T  o,  T  s  >  0.
Under these assumptions,  the protectionist  government  would never announce a tariff reform.
However, Rodrik (1987) has pointed out that if an international  agency makes an offer of loans or
transfers in return  for tariff reform, it might be in the interest  of the protectionist  government  to announce
a free trade policy in order to receive the aid.  We will consider  the case in which the agency  makes a
transfer  to the country  of To in period  0 in return for a trade reform in period  0.  The government  cannot
commit itself to the period 1 tax rate, so the protectionist  government  will abandon  the trade reform in
period I and levy its optimal  tariff T  s.  The free trade government  will maintain the free trade policy
in period 1.
14A. The Foreign Investment  Decision
Foreign investors earn a return of RK(0,Z) in period 0.  In period 1, foreign investors earn
RK(O,ZF)  if the government  is type F and RK(T?I,Zl)  if the government  is type P, where Zi is the period
I investment  when the government  is type i.  As noted  above, we assume  that there is no tariff in period
I and positive investment  takes place if the government  is type F, so the return is r, in this case (from
(3)).  If the government  is type P, an optimal tariff will be chosen by the protectionist  government  to
maximize (9), given the value of 4  from period 1.  Note that since Rzp <  0 this tariff will lead to a
lower return on foreign investment,  given Z  =  4,  than would be obtained under F government  that
imposes no tariff.  This leads to two possibilities  for the second period return on foreign investment,
depending  on whether  or not the irreversibility  condition  binds.  If R(  ,4)  <  r;, then there will be no
additional  investment  in the second  period when  the government  is discovered  to be protectionist. Note
there are  two possibilities. Letting  ir  be the probability  that investors  assign  to the government  being  type
P, the condition  for period 0 investment  is
RK(0,ZO)  + 6[7rRK(I,,ZO)  +  (1-7r)rll  = VO  (10)
If the irreversibility  constraint  is not binding, then the second period return on foreign investment  will
not be affected  by the discovery  that the government  is type G.  In this case, the period 0 investment
decision  is unaffected  by 7r.
We will concentrate  on the case in which the irreversibility  constraint is binding in the second
period, so that (10) is determines  the level of first period investment.  Inverting (10) yields a solution
for the level of foreign investment,  4(ro,'  ,r), which has the properties
aZO  bRK  <  0  azO  O  ((rl-RKe (-)  )  11
=-~~K  <O  -=  <O  ( az0 o  8cR  - RK&+8R~  <0(1
8X  1  RKK  +  6 s RKKKK  K  +  6 1KK
15An increase in 7r reduces the amount of investment  that takes place, since it lowers the expected  return
to foreign investors.
Condition  (10)  establishes  that the level of investment  will be dependent  on the investors' beliefs
about  the government's  type. This means  that the government's  welfare function  will now depend  on ir,
since welfare can be written as WV(ro,r 1,ZO(r7 0,T,7r),Z 1(r7- 0,rr))  -Wi(r 0 o,r7r).  From (4),  aW/8Z,  =  -
Z,R'Z >  0 when evaluated at -r =  0.  Utilizing (1 1), this means that aWF(o,0,7)/81r  <  0, since a greater
likelihood  that the government is protectionist  reduces the amount  of investment,  which is undesirable
for a free trade government.  Free trade governments  will find it costly if they are confused with
protectionist  governments,  since it will make it more difficult  for them to attract foreign investment.
B. Equilibrium  in the Signalling  Game
We assume  that the game  between  the governments  and the foreign  investors  proceeds  as follows.
Governments,  who have private information  about their types, move first and announce  a trade policy
prior to period 0.  Foreign investors  then choose their level of investment,  and the international  agency
makes  a transfer of T if the country  has chosen a free trade policy. In period 1, the governments  choose
a value of T, and foreign investors  then make their choice of Z,.
An important  aspect  of this problem  is that the foreign  investment  decision  depends  on the beliefs
about  the government's  type. Since  the government  moves  first and the government  is the agent with the
private information,  this can be analyzed  as a signalling  game because  the foreign investors  may able to
infer something  about the government's type from the government's choice of ro.  We will adopt the
concept of sequential  equilibrium to  analyze this game, as this is a widely accepted technique for
16analyzing games of this type. 9 Signalling games generally have two types of equilibria, pooling
equilibria  and separating  equilibria. A separating  equilibrium  is one in which type F governments  choose
a policy i(,  type P governments  choose a policy To',  and investors beliefs have beliefs such that 7r(TF)  =
O  and 7r(ro)  =  1. This will be a sequential  equilibrium  if these  policies are optimal  for the governments,
given the beliefs of the investors. A pooling equilibrium  is one in which a common  trade policy To is
chosen by both types of governments,  and 7r(rO)  =  7r, where 7r is the fraction of type P governments  in
the population.
We begin by illustrating  an example in which a pooling equilibrium  exists in which both types
of governments  choose a free trade policy  in period  0.  Suppose  that the beliefs  of investors are such that
any government  that imposes  a positive  period  0 tariff is assumed  to be a protectionist  government  (7r(ro)
=  I if To >  0) and a government  which chooses T any other tariff is assumed  to be protectionist  with
probability  7r. These beliefs will be consistent  with a pooling equilibrium  if given these beliefs, it is
optimal  for both types of governments  to choose To =  0.
The problem for the P government  is that a pooling equilibrium  will occur if it earns higher
welfare  by announcing  a free trade policy  and receiving  aid than it does by choosing  its optimal  tariff and
forgoing the aid.  This condition  is more likely to be satisfied  the greater is the value of aid, since this
increases  the incentive  to pursue the free trade policy.  One would also expect that it is more likely to
occur the lower the value of y, since a less protectionist  government  will face a lower cost of choosing
a free trade policy.
9 A  sequential  equilibrium  will  consist of a set  of beliefs, ir(TO),  which
characterize the investors' beliefs about the government's type given the trade
policy chosen, and a  set of  strategies for the players  (trade policies  for
governments and investment levels for investors).  These strategies must be
sequentially  rations, in the sense  that they maximize the  welfare of the  players
at each stage of the game, given the beliefs.  Furthermore, the beliefs and
strategies  must be consistent,  in that the  beliefs at any  point in  the game  which
is reached with positive probability must be consistent with updating according
to Bayes rule.
17It can be shown that with these beliefs, the free trade government  will also choose free trade. 10
This establishes  that a pooling equilibrium  will exist with these beliefs if the condition  just described  is
satisfied. Note that in the pooling equilibrium,  the F government  is hurt by the fact that the amount  of
foreign investment  is reduced (relative  to the case with Tr = 0) by the likelihood  that the government  is
protectionist. Therefore, we explore actions  that might be taken by the F government  to separate itself
from the P government.  A separating  equilibrium  exists if the type F government  offers a policy  T such
that it results in an equilibrium  in which each type of government  offers a distinct  policy package  and the
foreign investor  knows with certainty what type of government  it is facing.  Denote the characteristics
of the package offered by the type i  government in equilibrium by O.  In order for a separating
equilibrium  to exist, the P government  must prefer its payoff in the separating  equilibrium,  W'(C',7r= 1),
to the payoff it obtains  by imitating  the type F government  and receiving  the aid, WP(C',7r  = 0).
In order for a policy instrument  to be an effective  signal for the type F government,  it must be
more costly  for the type P government  to use the instrument  than for the type F to use it.  Rodrik (1989)
considers  the case of a free trade government  and a government  that puts greater weight  on tariff revenue,
and shows that there are parameter  values under which the free trade government  may use an import
subsidy  to signal its type.  From (9), it can be seen that an import subsidy  would be a potential  signal
in this environment  as well.  An import subsidy reduces the welfare of the P government  more by a
greater amount  than that of the F government,  since the P government  puts relatively  greater weight on
A
the losses of capital in the M sector.  There is a tariff rate To  <  0 at which the welfare of the P
government  when it receives  the transfer is the same  as obtained  when it receives  no transfer and sets the
10 Given T free trade is the optimal policy for the free trade government
from Proposition 2(b).  Since w  is constant for T  a  O with theae beliefs, free
trade dominates any import subsidy.  For T  >  0, we have W'(O,O,,) >  W'(T,O,)  >
WF(T,O,1),  where the first equality follows from Proposition 2b and the second
follows from the fact that WI is decreasing in w.  This establishes that free
trade is optimal.
18optimal tariff.  Thus, if the F government  sets a tariff Tr ￿  T  the P government will not choose to
imitate. The F government  will choose to separate if the welfare level obtained with this import subsidy
is at least as large as that attained  in the pooling  equilibrium.
A second type of policy would be a subsidy to foreign investment.  The subsidy to foreign
investment  is also more costly to the P government  than to the F government, because the inflow of
foreign  investment  reduces  the welfare  of specific  factor  owners  in the import-competing  sector  by driving
up the domestic wage.  In order to separate, the F government  must choose a subsidy  sufficiently  large
that the P government  prefers to set its optimal tariff T P than to choose free trade and the investment
subsidy.
B. Simulations  of Separating  Subsidy  Policies
The comparisons  of welfare levels required to determine  whether P government  will choose to
imitate the free trade policy and whether  the F government  will use subsidy  policies to separate  from the
P government  both require analysis  of the welfare effects of discrete changes in the policy variables.
Given the complexity  of the model, general results will not be available  by differentiation  of the welfare
functions. Therefore, we use simulation  analysis  to illustrate  the effects of changes  in the parameters  of
the model on the existence of a separating equilibrium and on the relative attractiveness  of import
subsidies  and investment  subsidies  for the F government.
Table 1 illustrates  the effect of the preference  for protection  on the part of the P government  on
the cost of separation for the F government  when FDI is irreversible. The specific factor model was
estimated  assuming Cobb-Douglas  production  functions  in each sector (Yx =  (Z+Kx  KjLx  S and YM  =
KM 5'LM- 5)  and a welfare  function W  =  In DMO  +  In DXO  +  o(ln  DMI  +  In D),).  The first column of
19Table I shows the level of the import subsidy required for the F government  to separate from the P
government  for a low value of the taste parameter for protection  (-y =  .025) and a higher value (y =
.075).  For this exercise, the factor endowments  chosen were (L =  100, KM  =  15, KX = 25), and the
discount  parameter  ,  and world interest factor 5 were both set equal to .9.  Source country returns on
foreign  investment  were assumed  to be ro = .75 and r; = .7, with the lower second  period return chosen
to ensure Z 1 >  4  for the free trade government. 11 The transfer from the international  agency was set
at .4.
Table 1: Optimal fiscal instrument  for low and high preferences  for protection
Import Subsidy  Investment  Subsidy
Low preference  for protection
(=  .025)  .03  .03
Utility: 13.1464  Utility: 13.1453
Subsidy  cost: 0.321  Subsidy  cost: 0.247
High preference  for
protection (  =  .075)  0  0
With these parameter values, the P government  chose to imitate a free trade policy when -y =
.025 but not when y =  .075.  A separating  equilibrium  with free trade is obtained  in the latter case and
1 iNote that the ri values represent rentals on capital  (and  not rates of
returns).In order for investment in capital to be profitable, we must have ro  +
br , a  q,  where q  is  the cost of the capital good.  We treat the stock of capital
as given, and do not analyze the investment problem.
20there is no need to use subsidies  to separate the two types of government. This is consistent  with the
hypothesis  that separation is easier the more protectionist  is the P government. The transfer from the
international  agency was too small in this case to  make it worthwhile for the highly protectionist
government  to lower its tariff.
For the case when y = .025, separation  is not obtained  with free trade. A separating  equilibrium
can be obtained  if the F government  sets an import subsidy  of .03.  This subsidy  results in a sufficiently
large reduction  in the return to sector  M interests  that the P government  is unwilling  to offer the subsidy.
This is consistent  with Rodrik's notion that governments  may be forced to liberalize  more quickly than
they would like in order to make their policies credible  with international  agencies (i.e. to convince  the
agencies and investors  that they are really type F governments). A similar result is obtained with an
investment  subsidy. A subsidy  of .03 to foreign investment  will also achieve  separation.  T  h  e
comparison of welfare levels with the two separation tools indicates that the welfare level of the F
government  is higher when it uses the import subsidy. However, the cost of the import subsidy is also
higher than the foreign investment  subsidy. Thus, if tax collection  to finance the subsidies  is high, the
investment  subsidy  might be the preferred policy.
Table 2 shows how the level of the import subsidy required to separate varies with the factor
endowments  for 5 cases. Case (a) corresponds  to the values  from Table 1 (KM  = 15 and KX  = 25), with
each of the succeeding  cases obtained  by simultaneously  reducing KM  by 2.5 and increasing  K4 by 2.5
from the previous case.  Since the endowment  of labor and the total endowment  of specific factors (Kx
+ KM)  is a constant  across the cases, the level of foreign  investment  under free trade is the same  for each
case."2 The larger is KX,  the greater will be the amount  of exports at free trade.  Cases (a)-(e) can thus
12  This follows from the fact that with the specific factors model, the
market wage rate is determined by the domestic relative price of good M when
sector  X  capital  is mobile  internationally.  The  labor market  equilibrium
condition can be written as
21be thought  of as indicating  a greater degree of reliance  on trade, holding  the degree  of foreign investment
constant.
Table 2: Separating  Equilibrium  with Import Subsidy
(a)  (b)  (C)  (d)  I  _(e)
Km  15  12.5  10  7.5  5
KX  25  27.5  30  32.5  35
Free Trade Government
Import subsidy  .03  .0269  .0225  .0158  .0075
Total Amount  .321  .3788  .3979  .3336  .1841
of subsidy
imO  10.7009  14.1821  17.6833  21.1116  24.5425
exO  13.9403  17.2323  20.7171  24.094  27.5324
imi  10.5501  14.077  17.617  21.1753  24.7463
exI  18.8785  22.3516  25.8116  29.2532  32.6822
Zo  5.331  5.000  4.889  4.680  4.519
Zi  11.020  11.020  11.020  11.020  11.020
U  13.1464  13.1465  13.1468  13.1470  13.1471
Protectionist Government
tO  .05711  0.6305  .07044  .07992  .09262
ti  .06687  .07517  .08597  .10073  .12241
ZO  2.682  2.818  2.986  3.198  3.475
Zi  8.947  9.071  9.227  9.433  9.721
(KX+Z)  LX  +KM  aLM=L
aKX  aKM
where  aij  is  the  requirement  of  factor  i per  unit  of  good  j.  With  w  determined
from  the competitive  profit  conditions,  the factor  ratios  aW/aN  are  fixed.  The
level  of  Z will  thus  adjust  to  satisfy  the  labor  market  equilibrium  condition.
Under  the  assumption  that  factor  intensities  are  the  same  in  each  sector,  aa  =
aLm  and  aKx  =  aKm.  Therefore,  changes  in  Kx  and  KM  that  keep  the  sum  of  factor
endowments  constant  will  not  affect  labor  demand,  so  Z  is  the  same  for  cases  (a)
-(e)  at  free  trade.
22Table 2 indicates  that as the degree of reliance  on trade increases,  the F government  can separate
itself at a lower import  tariff.  The reason for this can be seen by observing  that the optimal  tariff for the
protectionist  government  rises as the volume  of trade increases. Therefore, it will be more costly  for the
protectionist  government  to imitate the F government  when the volume  of trade is large. The effect of
the level of Kx  on the cost of the separation  program is ambiguous,  since a higher  value of Kx  means a
lower import  subsidy  but a greater volume  of imports. Interestingly,  the total cost of the subsidy  program
initially  increases with Kx, reaching a maximum  at Kx = 30, and then declines.
Table 3: Separating  Equilibrium  with Investment  Subsidy
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)
Km  15  12.5  10  7.5  5
Kx  25  27.5  30  32.5  35
Free Trade Govemment
lnvestmentSubsi  .03  .0278  .0243  .0192  .01
dy  .
Total Amount  .247  .221  .180  .131  .0565
of subsidy
imO  10.1943  13.7415  17.2857  20.8415  24.4079
exO  16.0502  19.3814  22.5853  25.6527  28.3596
imI  10.7943  14.2965  17.7997  21.3035  24.8079
exI  18.6343  22.132  25.6289  29.1251  32.6206
Zo  8.225  7.932  7.471  6.810  5.654
Zi  11.020  11.020  11.020  11.020  11.020
U  13.1453  13.1456  13.1459  13.1464  13.1469
Protectionist Government
tO  .05711  0.6305  .07044  .07992  .09262
ti  .06687  .07517  .08597  .10073  .12241
ZO  2.682  2.818  2.986  3.198  3.475
ZI  8.947  9.071  9.227  9.433  9.721
23Table 3 illustrates  the same exercise  for the case of an investment  subsidy. The conclusions  are
similar for this case.  The greater is the volume of trade, the higher is the optimal tariff for the P
government and the lower is the subsidy at which the F government  can separate.  This indicates  that
when the volume of trade is greater, it is more costly for the P government  to imitate the free trade
government,  as in the case of the import  subsidy. However,  the cost of the investment  subsidy  program
is monotonically  decreasing in Kx.  This result is due to the fact that ZO  is decreasing in Kx in the
separating equilibrium, so that the subsidy involves both a lower rate and a lower level of foreign
investment  as Kx increases.
An interesting  aspect of Tables 2 and 3 is that it reinforces  the conclusion  of Table 1 regarding
the relative attractiveness  of import  subsidies  and investment  subsidies. Import subsidy  programs result
in higher utility levels in the separating  equilibrium,  but also in higher expenditures  on subsidies. The
attractiveness  of import subsidies relative to investment  subsidies will depend on the cost of raising
additional  revenues  for the government.
V. Summary
It may be helpful  to summarize  the major policy conclusions  of the paper in an integrated  form.
This is the purpose of Table 4. The paper has analyzed  two sources of credibility problems faced by
governments:  (i) investors  know  the  government  policy  preferences  but ignore  if the government  will have
later an incentive  to change its position (time inconsistency)  and (ii) investors are uncertain about the
actual government preferences and have reasons to doubt their commitment  to change. In addition,
investors are uncertain  as to whether  the government  can commit  or not to its policy statements.
24Table 4: Optimal Trade Policy  to Attract Foreign Investors
Government Preferences are  1  Government Preferences  are not
known by investors  known by investors
Government can commit
Reversible investment  Free Trade  Free Trade (unless clear prefefence
for domestic producers)
Irreversible investment  Free Trade  Free Trade (unless clear preference
for domestic producers)
Government cannot commdit
Reversible investment  Free Trade  Do whatever government prefers
Irreversible investment  Tax imports once investment made  *  If government is protectionist:
tax imports
*  if government is free trade
oriented: subsidize investment or
imports
These two dimensions  offer four optimal strategies  for the government  as seen in Table 3. The
issue is however somewhat  trickier as in some cases, the optimal  government  strategy  may also depend
on whether  the foreign investment  decision  is irreversible  or not.
In a nutshell, if investors know the government  preferences, they also know that the optimal
strategy  for the government  will generally  be free trade. In particular, if a government  can commit  to its
policy statements,  the usual recommendation  of free trade prevails. This is a reassuring  result  confirming
the standard  results of traditional  trade theory.
The most interesting  result of the paper however is obtained  for the most realistic case in which
a government  cannot commit, in particular when investment  is irreversible. In this more realistic  case,
this model suggests that the conventional  theoretical wisdom can be misleading  because the optimal
strategy  to follow  is generally  to tax imports  when the current government  preferences  are clearly  known
25to  investors. When investors do  not know the government type however and free trade oriented
governments want to  separate themselves from the crowd, a  zero tariff will not  be  enough for
governments  who want to signal their commitment  to change. It will cost them and they will have to
subsidize  investment  or imports if they want to be able to attract FDI. The fastest way to attract FDI is
an investment  subsidy but it is also the most costly, which may be an important  consideration  for a
reforming  government  trying to keep the fiscal situation  under tight control.
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